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case. In light of United States v. Johnson, supra, and Davis v.
United States, supra, it may well be that there would have been no
reversible error, even if no corrective instructions had been given
by the West Virginia trial courts.
Problems arising in the principal case and Griffin v. California,
supra, apparently have not troubled West Virginia courts. These
cases will provide guidelines for future practices incident to comment upon an accused's failure to testify in states such as Ohio
and California. The problem has been alleviated in part by the
recent Supreme Court ruling that there will be no retrospective
application of federal standards on self-incrimination in the several
states. Tehan v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 459 (1966). West Virginia's standards seem to be consistent with federal standards concerning comment on a defendant's failure to testify and self-incrimination. Therefore, the recent decisions should not disturb
established and recognized West Virginia standards.
fames Truman Cooper

Criminal Law-Use of Injunctive Proceedings to Suppress Evidence
During the course of an income tax investigation, books and
records belonging to P and his wholly-owned corporation were
examined by Internal Revenue agents. On several occasions special
agents participated in the examination. Although the special
agents were identified as such, P was unaware that their presence
indicated he was undergoing a criminal tax fraud investigation.
Without informing P of his constitutional guarantees of freedom
from self-incrimination and right to counsel under the fifth and
sixth amendments, the agents questioned P and confiscated certain
books and records against receipt. P, a resident of North Carolina,
instituted an action in another forum to prohibit the retention or
use of the information obtained by unconstitutional means. The
district court refused to grant the injunction. Held, affirmed. In
the exercise of discretion, a court may properly withhold relief
that might involve interference in the criminal proceedings of another forum. The proper forum for such a proceeding is the district
in which the property was seized or in which the criminal trial
is to be held. Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
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The fourth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. As a consequence the Supreme Court has held that a federal court could
not retain illegally seized property for use as evidence after seasonable application for its return had been filed. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The early history of suppression of evidence seems to denote
the availability of two remedies-a motion for suppression of evidence and an independent equity proceeding. Cogen v. United
States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929). The significant difference between
the two remedies did not seem to rest on the form of the petition as
much as the circumstances surrounding its presentation to the
court. A motion filed prior to indictment was generally considered
an independent equity proceeding, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465 (1921); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918),
while a motion made after indictment, as in the Cogen case, was
usually considered an interlocutory motion.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
in 1946, however, the procedure for suppression of illegally seized
evidence was codified in Rule 41(e). The rule provides that a
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may petition
the district court to suppress evidence and to return property on
the grounds therein specified. This provision substantially embodies the practice which antedated its adoption. Only one significant alteration has been established. On the basis of the Supreme
Court ruling in DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962),
a Rule 41(e) motion is of an interlocutory nature; a final decree
may be rendered only when this preindictment motion is for the
return of property, and the action is unrelated to any criminal
proceeding.
The consequence of the adoption of Rule 41(e) and the DiBella
interpretation is the question of whether the injunction is still
an available remedy. The recent resolution of certain constitutional
issues has only intensified the dispute.
Prior to 1961, illegally obtained evidence was admissable in
many state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). In an
effort to prevent federal officials from reaping the fruits of an
illegal search and seizure in state proceedings, the Supreme Court
ruled that federal courts should enjoin the use of such information
by the federal officials. Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956).
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The evidence sought to be suppressed in Rea was marihuana, a
narcotic of a tangible nature. Although the petitioner had been
successful in preventing the admission of this item in evidence at
the federal level by a Rule 41(e) motion, he was still threatened
at the state level by a charge of possession of narcotics in violation
of New Mexico state law. As this evidence was admissible in
the state proceedings, the Court held that the issuance of an injunction was a proper exercise of the federal court's supervisory
power over federal officials.
The doctrine embodied in the Rea case received further consideration in 1961 when a federal court enjoined a state officer
from testifying in a state proceeding. Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d
368 (2d Cir. 1961). The alleged violation in the Bolger case was
the failure of the federal officers to comply with Rule 5(a),
which contemplates a proceeding before a commissioner immediately upon arrest. Bolger sought the suppression of evidence
obtained by the officers as a result of his illegal detention. Like
the Rea case, the evidence in Bolger was a narcotic.
Although the officer against whom the injunction was sought
was a state official and merely a witness to the illegal detention
conducted by federal officials, the court found the injunction
proper. The court reasoned that such action was necessary to
insure compliance with federal rules by federal officials. The effect of the earlier Supreme Court decision in Mapp was disregarded by the circuit court because the unclear scope of the doctrine
rendered uncertain Mapp's applicability to the federal rules, constitutional prohibitions and administrative proceedings.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, however, the circuit court
decision was reversed. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U. S. 392 (1963). The
Court held that (in light of its recent decision in Mapp) an injunction was not the proper remedy to suppress evidence obtained
in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This
holding was in essence a reaffirmation of Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U. S. 117 (1951). Stefanelli is exemplary of the policy of federal
non-intervention in state proceedings involving violations of the
fourteenth amendment.
The theory of the dissenting opinions in Cleary hinges on the
undetermined scope of Mapp. The dissenters reason that until
the boundaries of Mapp are ascertained, federal courts should

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1966

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [1966], Art. 11
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

regulate state officers who attempt to provide a screen for the
illegal activities of federal officials.
Limitations on federal court intervention in state proceedings are
inherent in the American judicial system. According to section
2283 of the Judicial Code, a federal court may interfere in state
proceedings only when authorized by an act of Congress, or when
necessary in aid of jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its
judgments. Moreover, the doctrine of federal abstention embodies
the principle that a federal court may not enjoin a state court
absent a showing of great and irreparable injury. 62 COLuM. L.
Rv. 358 (1962). Thus, with the Cleary and Mapp decisions as
precedent, it is doubtful that there will be any further federal
injunctive relief in state proceedings. This is particularly true
because the remedy provided by Mapp was not available at the
time of the Rea decision.
Consequently, Mapp casts a shadow of a doubt on the future of
Rea as persuasive authority. Rea was designed to prevent federal
officials from testifying about illegally seized evidence in states
where no statute prohibited its admissibility. Since the Mapp
decision, the evil that Rea was designed to prevent no longer
exists.
It is plausible, however, that equitable relief still may be available in states providing no adequate remedy for suppression of
evidence in advance of indictment. Seemingly, a preindictment
hearing on the admissibility of evidence should be a state practice
as well as a federal one. When no such procedural step is available, the defendant is left solely to his objection at the trial stage
and consequently is susceptible to indictment on the basis of this
evidence. The stigma arising from the public accusation of an
indictment can seldom be erased by acquital. Note, Developments
in the Law of Confessions, 79 HIAv. L. REv. 1054 (1966).
The applicable statute in West Virginia is exemplary of the
absence of statutory authority for preindictment hearings in the
states. According to the West Virginia statute, no hearing on the
admissibility of evidence is available in advance of indictment.
W. VA. CoDE ch. 62, art. 1A, § 6 (Michie Supp. 1965). The determination of this issue prior to indictment seems imperative from
a tactical viewpoint since the defendant's plea is relevant to the
evidence to be presented against him. Moreover, as indictments
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generally are not subject to being quashed because inadmissible
evidence is submitted to the grand jury, the preindictment motion
may be the only means of preventing a wrongful indictment,
Note, 79 HAv. L. REv., supra at 1055.
The principal case, however, deals with the efficacy of injunctive relief on a federal level. The denial of equitable relief in this
instance does not revolve on the reluctance of federal courts to
enjoin a state proceeding, but rather on their reluctance to enjoin
criminal proceedings in another forum. The soundness of this
principle is not to be questioned; however, its applicability to the
factual situation may be questioned.
Some cases have held that the suppression of evidence prior to
indictment is not an instance in which equity may be invoked to
stay a criminal proceeding. The relief sought is merely the return
of property and the restraint of the use of certain information. The
principle that equity may prevent the use of illegally obtained
evidence is well established. Goodman v. Lane, 48 F.2d 32 (8th
Cir. 1931).
The court in Austin v. United States, 297 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1961)
reached a result contrary to the principal case by relying on this
premise. The petitioner in Austin sought the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments.
The evidence was of a tangible nature only to the extent that
notes were taken on statements made by the petitioner. Having
refuted the contention that this was an action in restraint of criminal
proceedings, the court granted the injunction on the theory that
the petitioner had the right to use either a motion or an injunction
to have his claim adjudicated. The court's recognition of the injunction and motion procedures as concurrent remedies makes the
decision valuable precedent.
Despite the holding in Austin, the equitable remedy for suppression of evidence is not firmly established. Historically, equity
courts have not exercised their discretionary powers when an adequate remedy is available at law. In this instance the motion
procedure seems adequate except in cases like Bolger where the
state has no procedure for preindictment determination of the
admissibility of evidence.
The most favorable climate for the use of the injunction seems
to lie in the area of statements and confessions obtained in
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violation of the fifth amendment. The fifth amendment provides
that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a
criminal proceeding.
In a majority of jurisdictions, pretrial motions to suppress
illegally obtained confessions have not been entertained. The
justification for such action has been that the trial was the appropriate forum for the resolution of factual disputes concerning
the voluntariness of a confession. Note, 79 HARv. L. REv., supra
1054.
Suppression of a confession by injunction was held proper in
In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947). Although the second
circuit recognized the use of the injunction for such a purpose,
federal courts are split on this issue. Justification for equitable
relief in this area seems to rest on the prevailing controversy in
the circuits concerning the scope of Rule 41(e). In Biggs v. United
States, 246 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1957), the court held that Rule 41(e)
does not apply to violations of the fifth amendment. This decision
was based on the absence of any provision in the rule regarding suppression of evidence of this type. The court held that the plaintiff's
only remedy was an objection to the admission of the evidence at
the trial stage. The sixth circuit also held that the sole authority
for the suppression of evidence is found in Rule 41(e) and that
its operativeness depends upon a violation of constitutional rights
under the fourth and not the fifth amendment. United States v.
Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956).
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme
Court determined that verbal evidence flowing from an illegal
search and detention is no less the "fruit" of federal illegality than
objects of a more tangible nature. The effect of this holding on
the scope of Rule 41(e) is also undetermined. However, it
would seem that until such a determination is made, equitable
relief may be the vehicle for suppression of evidence obtained
in violation of the fifth amendment. To allow the return of an
indictment based on an illegally obtained confession is as wrongful as allowing the return of an indictment based on evidence of
a more tangible nature. By preventing an indictment based on
evidence that will not be admissible at the trial, the courts can
avoid damage to the reputation of the individual.
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Thus, the use of the injunction for the suppression of evidence
has become limited by recent constitutional developments. Its
future in some areas remains uncertain. The success of the remedy
will rest ultimately on the interpretation given the scope of Rule
41(e). Similarly, the granting of equitable relief in situations like
that in Bolger v. Cleary, supra, may depend upon the interpretation of state statutes providing no preindictment method for suppressing evidence.
Ellen FairfaxWarder

Evidence-Use of Learned Treatises in Cross-Examination
of Expert Witnesses
An action was brought on behalf of a minor, by his father
and next friend, to recover damages for allegedly negligent medical and hospital treatment which necessitated the amputation of
the minor's right leg below the knee. At the trial, the court
permitted cross-examination of the defendant's expert witnesses
concerning the views expressed in recognized treatises in their
fields, although the experts had not relied on these treatises as
bases for their views on direct examination. The trial court rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, affirmed. The rule that an
expert can be cross-examined only about those texts upon which
he expressly bases his opinion is not supported by sound reasoning.
Expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment of
justice if cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recognized authorities expressed in treatises or periodicals written
for professional colleagues. Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
It is the general rule that treatises are not admissible for substantive evidence purposes. This is due primarily to the fact that
they are composed of opinions and views of persons not under
oath and not subject to cross-examination and thus in violation of
th6 hearsay rule. 6 WiGMoBE, EvmENca §§ 1690-92 (3d ed. 1940).
The same reasons for excluding
been carried over into the area
witnesses. It is maintained that
examiner to present the contents

books on direct evidence have
of cross-examination of expert
this would enable the crossof the treatise to the jury as
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